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Abstract 
The key issue in this study is access to land registration, which is the official responsibility of 
the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional, hereafter NLA). Nonetheless other 
official institutions such as the Department of Forestry and regional governments have 
authority over issues pertaining to land usage as well. Moreover, local custom (usually called 
adat 1) can be a normative source opposing NLA decisions. This case study is concerned with 
the role of the NLA in deciding and maintaining land tenure at the district level, amidst the 
various interests of the district’s economy and the population. The research focuses on the 
ways in which the local population seeks redress of (perceived) grievances related to land 
issues: how do poor inhabitants of East Kalimantan deal with disputes over land?   
The paper shows how possibilities for addressing land related grievances have 
improved since Reformasi. First important change has been that local population groups 
have come to demand recognition of adat-based rights to land or compensation for adat lands 
in use by others. In many instances NGOs took the lead in this, organising blockades and 
occupations. A second important change has been that elected government officials are 
nowadays given to considering the political benefits which they could gain from supporting 
these land claims. Rather than reverting to police or military assistance as was common in 
the New Order era,, Paser’s government engages in dialogue and takes a diplomatic 
approach to settling these issues.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Access to land and security of tenure are essential in subsistence farming as well as for 
marked-oriented agricultural enterprises (plantations) and natural resources extraction 
industries (mines, logging companies). East Kalimantan’s economy is an economy that is 
moving from local subsistence farming to macro-scale, market-oriented crop cultivation. This 
process has gradually been taking place, increasing in intensity from the nineteen sixties. 
Large commercial plantations were established. First rubber, cacao and cloves, later followed 
by huge oil palm monocultures. Palm oil presently is East Kalimantan’s main agricultural 
export product, while open pit coal mining provides the raw resources that fuel power stations 
throughout East Asia. Both plantations and mines need land, which has been made available 
in two ways. First, forests have been cleared for the exclusive purpose of obtaining plantation 
land and access to coal, second, forest land which had already been cleared by the logging 
industry was allocated to these sectors.  
Next to land, plantation and mining companies require a work force. Sparsely 
populated East Kalimantan could not provide for sufficient labour, making the province a 
major destination for both private and government-sponsored migration. For centuries Bugis 
                                                 
1 Adat is the embodiment of the traditions and ‘customary law’ of Indonesia’s various ethnic groups. It is a 
potential source of land rights that has been largely ignored by the New Order regime, notwithstanding its 
inclusion in a number of relevant laws. As we shall see, adat based land claims not only posed sensitive and 
complex problems to regional governments, but form a source of conflict in government circles as well. 
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from Sulawesi, Banjar from South Kalimantan, Javanese and Chinese had been arriving and 
settling in East Kalimantan of their own account. Extensive government transmigration 
programs brought large groups of migrants who were settled in prefabricated villages or 
added whole neighbourhoods to existing ones. Plots for personal usage were made available 
to them by local governments and many obtained work in the plantations or mines. Initially 
transmigration thus ‘happened’ to the population of East Kalimantan. Transmigrants often 
arrived in whole communities, were numerous and provided for, and thus had little need to 
concern themselves with local matters. Transmigration officials, and transmigrants, referred to 
the discourse of nationhood. Transmigrants were Indonesians moving to another part of 
Indonesia; one nation with the same laws and the same access to land for all. 
In the post-New order political climate these assumptions are questioned. Local 
interests have become prominent in regional affairs. Direct elections of regional heads and 
parliamentarians has substantially increased attention for the local next to, or sometimes in 
conflict with, that of the nation. In East Kalimantan, the application of national land law has 
come under pressure from powerful appeals to local adat. The validity of such adat-based 
rights is established in national land law, although subject to severe limiting conditions. Adat 
rights are subsidiary to national interests and all land rights distinguished in official land law. 
This effectively limits the official validity of adat to land on which no other rights are placed; 
a situation that is close to non-existent in Indonesia.  
Yet throughout the nation, adat rights to land are argued through appeals to 
indigeneity. Original populations feel they lost tremendous stretches of their adat lands to 
accommodate state interests, companies and immigrants. Pointing out their sacrifices, these 
groups address local governments demanding return or recompense of these lands. In 
Kalimantan, this issue gained muscle through the violent expulsion of Madurese migrants 
from West and Central Kalimantan by indigenous Dayak and Malay who justified their 
actions –among others- as a removal of illegal settlers from local adat lands. Yet descendants 
of earlier migrants who occupy adat lands have become an intrinsic and respected feature of 
local society in many areas. The exclusiveness of adat and the grievance that unauthorised 
usage of adat land entails thus seem to have an inherent political dimension. 
 
Focus 
In this report I am particularly concerned with the access to land and the settlement of claims 
for one group, ‘the poor’. Defined as people with little property and financial means, this 
group transcends ethnic boundaries and comprises members of the original population, 
descendants of earlier migrants as well as recent arrivals. All claim land in East Kalimantan, 
be it through adat, indigeneity or national law. The role of the NLA in adjudicating land 
matters is a pivotal point of this research, as the NLA is the government agency responsible 
for land registration. Used together, registration and the issuing of a land certificate should 
improve the legal certainty of the certificate-holder. Yet in large parts of the nation such 
certification does not, as yet, inspire such certainty. NLA officials have a tenacious reputation 
for corruption. They are seen as demanding sums far higher than the required fees, as giving 
out multiple certificates to plots of land and as ‘loosing’ documents from their archives when 
this is convenient. Obviously such acts cannot be singularly ascribed to all NLA officials but 
the reputation effects the entire institution and causes many individual Indonesians to seek 
alternative sources of certainty. The dynamic impact of reformasi on Indonesian politics 
makes clear that government authority is not obvious. When considering authority over access 
to land, one should thus look beyond the established rules and laws and include political 
processes and local power relations. Why do people turn to specific authorities? The answer, I 
suspect, is much related to what people perceive as ‘justice’.   
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Research in Paser 
Data for this paper were gathered in the East Kalimantan district of Paser, where I have 
worked extensively from 2004 to 2010. Because of this background in the area as well as 
being well acquainted with the province at large, I found that an in-depth discussion of access 
to land at the level of a district may function to signal developments that are likely to hold 
relevance throughout the province.             
Paser is the southernmost district of East Kalimantan. Its territory borders the districts 
of Paser Utara Penajam and Kutai Barat to the north, the provinces of South and Central 
Kalimantan to the south and west, and the Strait of Makassar to the East. The district’s main 
geographical features are a flat stretch of fertile land along the coast that gives way to the 
steep northern stretch of the Meratus mountain range, known locally as Gunung Lumut, to the 
north and west. In 2002 Paser lost around a quarter of its territory and almost forty percent of 
its population when its northern stretch became part of Paser Utara Penajam, a new district 
consisting of northern Paser (Paser Utara) and the Penajam area that used to be part of the 
municipality of Balikpapan. 
Paser’s territory covers some 11,600 square kilometres and houses a population of 
185,000, most of whom are farmers living on the flat, coastal land (Badan Pusat Statistik, 
2008:57). The district’s capital is the city of Tanah Grogot, which also is the main commercial 
and administrative centre. A number of large market villages have developed along the 
provincial road that bisects the district and connects Balikpapan and Samarinda to 
Banjarmasin, the capital of South Kalimantan. Small villages are scattered throughout the 
district, but mainly on the plain and along the coast.  
The district is named after the Orang Paser, a population group that considers itself the 
original inhabitants of the area and is related to Dayak groups living further inland. Orang 
Paser currently make up around 40 percent of the district’s population. Sub-groups living in 
the mountains, on the plains between the sea and the mountains, and along the coast speak 
different dialects of Bahasa Paser and have variations in adat. Large numbers of Bugis from 
South Sulawesi live along the coast and on the plains, as do Banjarese from nearby South 
Kalimantan. Both groups have been living in Paser for centuries and have left their influence 
on culture and daily life. Over the past decades waves of migration and transmigration have 
brought Javanese, Balinese, East Nusa Tenggarese, Menadonese, Batak, Toraja and Madurese 
as well. 
Culturally, the district is divided between the Bugis-Malay-oriented coastal plain 
centred on the capital Tanah Grogot, and the mountains. Until recently, the lack of 
infrastructure isolated mountain communities, limiting the influx of migrants and maintaining 
their social and cultural orientation towards the Dayak tribes of the hinterland. The 
construction of roads by logging companies began to shift the focus of the mountain 
communities towards the coast.  
The capital Tanah Grogot has some 20,000 inhabitants, schools, a hospital, a large 
market and a shopping mall. The city is dominated by the many government offices of the 
district government, many of them new and built to impress. Its central street is a one-
kilometre stretch of four-lane highway flanked by official buildings, mansions, shops, and 
public institutions. Although small agricultural enterprises dominate its outskirts, the town is 
the undisputed urban centre of the area. 
Governance over the population and lands of Paser is a complex affair. Ministry of 
Forestry officials estimate that 65 percent of the land in the district comes under their 
authority. However, the regional forestry office does not possess a map delineating the 
borders between forest land and non-forest land. Notably in the coastal areas the NLA claims 
authority in land matters as well. Government bodies are less occupied with the forest land 
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designation of nearly all of the Gunung Lumut Mountains, contrary to the communities living 
there. These groups maintain claims of adat territories infringement of which gives rise to 
dispute. 
 
 
2. Disputes over land: two examples 
 
Building a boulevard 
The centre of Paser’s capital Tanah Grogot is bound to one side by the Kandilo River. Along 
its bank runs a thoroughfare that is mainly used to transport the produce and waste of the large 
daily market that sits next to it. Until recently, the riverbank itself was covered in a long row 
of shacks –for a large part built on stilts above the river- housing simple shops and basic food 
stalls. As reform brought financial circumstances more favourable to resource-rich regions, 
East Kalimantan’s natural resources industry provided its regional governments with 
considerable income. In many cities and districts this led to the construction of monumental 
new public buildings, mosques and offices. Paser had not stayed behind, and Tanah Grogot 
boasts a brand new giant mosque opposite the market and a parade ground laid out in Islamic 
architecture facing the river for ceremonial occasions. The ramshackle stands of the market –
now separating the mosque from the river- had been designated for removal, but public 
objections to moving the market and the legal ants‘ nest of multiple land claims had the 
government decide to leave the market for the time being and concentrate on improving the 
waterfront instead. A long boulevard was planned that would offer splendid views of the river 
and lead from the parade ground to the location of the evening market. This required the 
removal of the slum-like riverfront. 
 The slum dwellers claimed ownership of their shacks’ locations. Many had been living 
there for generations, as their fishermen-ancestors migrated from Sulawesi or Java and settled 
the riverbank conveniently located next to the market. Some of them were even Orang Bajau, 
whose ancestors were seafaring nomads and who felt that they had a right to their spot based 
on adat. None had land certificates, but all felt entitled to the land based on their long period 
of settlement. Opinions in the government offices differed. The NLA had a new head, an 
Orang Kutai originating from the neighbouring district and indigenous to East Kalimantan, 
who felt that although the government could freely avail of such land an indemnification 
would be in order. Simply removing these people, the NLA head felt, would deprive them of a 
home as much as of an income; for fishing they needed river access and the shops existed 
because of the spill over from the market. Hardliners in the government were not convinced. 
They maintained that as most of the shacks stood on stilts above the river, no land 
expropriation was taking place and hence no indemnification was required by law. The slum 
dwellers, with local NGO support, countered that at low tide a lot of land became exposed 
beneath their buildings and the issue therefore really concerned land. With the BAL as 
applicable law, its Article 27 decreed that suitable indemnification was necessary.  
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Tanah Grogot’s boulevard. 
 
 Ridwan Suwidi, the district head, agreed that an indemnification was in order and in 
open, public negotiation it was further established that land in the centre of Tanah Grogot 
commanded a high prize and that indemnifications should be generous, as the lives of entire 
families depended on the amount they would receive for a few square meters.2 With the eyes 
of Paserese society upon them, the regional government decided upon an indemnification of 
3,000,000 rupiah per square metre in December 2006, a sum virtually unheard of that elicited 
the dry comment from the provincial government that apparently land prices in Tanah Grogot 
had risen to the level of those in Menteng in Jakarta.3 The height of the indemnification gave 
considerable credibility to Paser’s district head as a socially concerned person, yet caused 
problems as well.  
Whereas the boulevard required indemnifications for a narrow stretch of shore only a 
couple of hundred of metres long, another project concerned enlargement of Paser’s main 
road. This road stretches some eighty kilometres and requires the purchase of land on both 
sides, most of which is private property and certified by the NLA in hundreds of individual 
plots. Preceding the boulevard indemnification, government staff had already engaged in 
negotiations with a number of land owners. In some cases agreement had already been 
reached, generally for amounts of 300,000 to 500,000 rupiah per square metre. In reaction to 
the outcome of the boulevard negotiations these land owners demanded withdrawal of these 
agreements, as much higher prices were now anticipated. The highest amount the government 
will be able to pay is 800,000 rupiah per metre, which –staff expects- will lead to considerable 
                                                 
2 No indemnification was paid for land that was claimed but beneath the water at low tide as well. 
3 Personal communication by provincial government staff, 30 March 2009. 
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disappointment if not dissatisfaction. The generous indemnification for the boulevard land 
thus has adverse effects as well. 
 
Claiming a plantation 
January 2009 saw an indigenous Paserese of little means, whom I will call Zainul, engage a 
palm oil company over ownership rights to land. Zainul maintained that the company had 
recently laid out a plantation on land to which he held adat rights. His neighbours and fellow-
villagers supported Zainul’s claim. As the company would not receive Zainul, he sent them a 
letter detailing his claim and requesting an indemnification. As the company did not reply, 
Zainul approached a local adat organisation for help.  
The organisation agreed to look into the case. After establishing the validity of 
Zainul’s claim with the local adat leader and Zainul’s fellow-villagers, they also sent a letter, 
requesting a reply within one week. When no reply came, they sent another letter informing 
the company that they would visit its office at a certain time and date. They also informed the 
police of this visit. Before the date arrived, however, the company contacted the adat 
organisation and proposed an indemnification. After some negotiation Zainul accepted this 
sum and paid the organisation 20 percent for their troubles.  
This adat organisation has a fixed working procedure. If no answer would have 
arrived, a group of several dozen members would go to the plantation’s office at the 
announced time and date. All would be dressed in white to show their good intentions but 
some would carry machetes, suggesting that they might want to destroy the plantation. If the 
company would not budge, the organisation’s members would occupy a part of the plantation 
lands or block the road. Nothing would be destroyed, but any work would be prevented. The 
company might request police assistance, but the police would be unwilling to interfere as 
they have a good relationship with this specific organisation and are convinced of the 
sincerity of its actions. The organisation maintains a register of claims and ensures that no two 
people claim the same plot of land from a company, thus ensuring a certain degree of security 
for the company as well. Moreover, they make sure that the number of claims made against a 
company within a given period of time is workable for said company. Too many claims 
would render a plantation unremunerative and could cause a company to quit Paser, thus 
damaging the local economy as a whole.   
 
 
3. Competing legal frameworks 
With these two examples I wanted to give an impression of the way people voice their 
grievances regarding land, and the strategies they employ to find a redress for these 
grievances. These grievances are related to an experience of a violation of adat-based land 
rights: as the Indonesian government for a long time did not acknowledge the validity of adat-
based land rights, people often perceived the attitude of the government towards their land 
claims as unjust. People in Paser claiming adat rights to land perceive these as valid for two 
reasons. First, because of the traditional and historic nature of such claims. Adat has been 
respected and followed for generations, dating back to before the independence of Indonesia. 
As one respondent put it: “our adat was even respected by the Dutch colonists when they 
came here, and now our own government is telling us that it is no longer valid? Nonsense”. 
The concept of a national government applying a nationwide legal system that rightfully 
supersedes local customary claims thus is disputed. A second reason for claiming the validity 
lies in the mentioning of adat rights in the BAL. Even though, as is discussed below, the legal 
status given to adat in that law does not necessarily mean that adat based claims are 
recognised, information provided by NGOs and others has instilled the notion that adat rights 
are at the very least a potential source for official recognition of a land claim.    
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Until recently, it was quite common for individuals claiming ownership of a plot of land 
based on adat to find that the National Land Agency in Tanah Grogot was unwilling to accept 
adat as sufficient ground to grant official ownership rights as well. Although this stance of the 
NLA has altered in recent years and its legal possibilities were severely restricted (see the 
next paragraph), this attitude is frequently considered as wilful obstruction or even 
malevolence of its personnel. Rural paserese often feel that official land law does contain 
recognition of adapt land rights, but that these regulations are not implemented. This notion 
was brought about by human right and indigenous peoples NGOs visiting these communities 
during ‘empowerment projects’, in which the communities where made aware of their status 
and rights under official Indonesian law. Exactly how or where and in which law adat land 
rights are recognised is not clear to most of the claimants, but this notion of validity inspires a 
feeling that the local government is acting against national law on purpose, favouring 
immigrants and large companies just as it did during the New Order.  
 
Whereas, for instance, adat-based land claims traditionally sufficed to arrange affairs among 
the Paserese population, large-scale immigration to Paser gave rise to conflicts emanating 
from the land needs of these new arrivals. The regional governments of the time showed a 
persistent disinclination to engage with these conflicts other than by hard-handed repressive 
methods. This caused, first, for people to remain silent but discontent regarding what was 
considered a violation of adat-based land claims. Second, it gave rise to an image of Paser as 
a region that was peaceful and complacent as no riots, fights or other serious violent outbreaks 
or social disruptions occurred. Yet this popular contentment was ostensive, as dissatisfaction 
over land rights continued to exist in the Paserese population. Regional government however, 
largely made up of immigrant officials and civil servants with few connections to Paserese 
communities, failed to pick up on this dissatisfaction or appreciate its severity. Upon 
Suharto’s resignation as President of Indonesia and the ensuing climate of greater democratic 
freedom, this dissatisfaction over land claims resurfaced in Paser. The perception that one’s 
land rights are not being recognized manifests itself, generally speaking, in the following 
types of grievances being voiced about land in East Kalimantan: 
 
1. Grievances over the seizure of land by others  
From the seventies onwards, authorities gave large tracks of land in Paser in use to companies 
and immigrants. Extensive parts of these lands were considered as adat land by local 
Paserese, thus giving rise to the grievance that the authorities ignored individual or group 
ownership of land. Quite often the Paserese claiming adat rights were willing to 
accommodate government plans with those lands –although the matter of local assent rarely 
featured among official planning- but felt that some type of recognition of their rights would 
be in order. Using other peoples’ lands without permission is a transgression of both Paserese 
adat and official land law. Taking other peoples’ land as one’s property without the original 
owners’ consent is theft. Paserese communities felt that they had never given up their 
ownership of those lands, at most they would agree to a temporal usage by others, but since 
their consent had not been asked at earlier stages they were due apologies, indemnifications, 
and a return of the lands. At the very least a decent agreement had to be drawn up in which 
Paserese rights to the land were acknowledged and safeguarded, and compensation or rent 
established with retrospective force.  
Grievances such as this are actively pursued in Paser and occasionally give rise to 
actual conflict. These grievances are voiced in terms of a violation of adat land rights. 
Migrants perceive this discourse around adat as threathening  – since many migrants use land 
that was assigned for transmigration or plantations by previous governments, often land that is 
claimed by others as adat land.        
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2. Grievances over the compensation of land that is being used by others 
Notably in the eighties and nineties did companies and on occasion the government pay 
attention to protests over the usage of adat land and offer –usually financial- compensation. 
Frequently communities deemed it wise to accept this money rather than remain completely 
empty handed. Following reformasi, however, numerous instances came to the fore in which 
the circumstances –under pressure of government force, which prevented fair negotiations- 
and the exact nature of the agreement were brought to the fore. Communities maintained that 
they had not given up their rights to the land but had only permitted usage. Continued usage 
by immigrants or companies was usually possible, but only after additional payments that 
would reflect the actual rental value of the land would have been made.  
This grievance is frequently part of the discourse that leads to conflicts over land. As 
with the preceding issue, solutions are often sought through adat organisations rather than 
through official channels. Yet as various adat organisations revert to putting pressure on 
opponents if negotiations do not work out, a strong and threatening undertone give adat rights 
a rather different meaning to the immigrants and companies that are targeted. As a 
spokesperson for an immigrant community confronted with such claims told me:  
 
“These claims cannot be real. We have held certificates to this land for the past twenty 
years and all of a sudden these claims are made. Not as long as the land was not in use 
but now that we have planted oil palm trees and they are bound to start bearing fruit, 
the land is claimed. These people are only looking for money.” 
 
Adat spokespersons counter that there was no point for them in voicing their claims under the 
New Order as this would only result in a reputation as upstarts. They maintain, however, that 
they had regularly reminded this specific immigrant community of their claim to the land, but 
that they had refrained from persisting too much for the reason stated.  
Defining justice in this and similar thorny situations is a highly delicate task for the 
relevant authorities. Adat authorities and interest groups have a very strong voice in this, 
although the power of the regional government often supersedes if the conflict reaches that 
level. In many instances, however, all parties involved prefer to keep a conflict low-level, and 
reach a swift settlement to which all parties agree. Neither authority wants to be accused of 
instigating large-scale disagreement with its counterpart, as both the district head and adat 
leaders publicly emphasize their respect for, and commitment to, each other’s authority. 
Reputations are at stake for both adat and government officials and both prefer to settle a 
matter before the other comes in. Rivalry over public favour clearly plays a part in this as 
well.  
 
 
4. The law: possibilities and hindrances 
 
 Box 3: “The BAL actually recognises adat rights to land, did you know that? Article 5 
states that the law governing land and water is actually adat law. The problem is that this 
article also states conditions under which adat rights can be limited. There cannot be 
conflicts with the interests of the nation or those of the state, other regulations in the BAL 
or even conflicts with Indonesian sosialism. Who has ever heard of Indonesian socialism? 
And if government officials are allowed to decide what is in the interest of the government 
or the state –are adat communities not part of the state as well?- and if all other regulations 
in the BAL precede Article 5, then how can the BAL be properly applied? 
(Arguments given by an East Kalimantan adat activist as to why the application of the 
BAL is in the wrong hands with the government). 
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Three pieces of legislation are of major importance when it comes to obtaining and 
safeguarding access to land. The Basic Agrarian Law (BAL), the Basic Forestry Law, and the 
Regional Autonomy Laws (RAL). Below follows a brief discussion of these laws. 
 
The Basic Agrarian Law 
The BAL4 is an umbrella law providing a framework for a national system of land legislation. 
It does not contain many elaborated stipulations, but rather provides principles according to 
which implementing legislation was to be formulated. It is distinctly nationalist in its outlook. 
Article 1 decrees that all of Indonesia’s territory as well as the natural resources it includes 
belong to the Indonesian people. The state is the manager of the land (Article 2), but –as  
Article 6 states- all rights to land must have a social function. Whereas this implies that 
collective rights supersede individual ones, Article 7 decrees that the general interest should 
be protected by limiting large landownership. The BAL instructs the establishment by law of 
a maximum size of land property (Article 17), and the formal registration of all land tenure to 
guarantee its certainty (Article 19). Article 9 stresses that all Indonesian citizens, men and 
women alike, have an equal right to land to provide for their needs. Nonetheless the interest of 
the state is paramount: the government has the authority to withdraw citizens’ land rights if 
this is in the national interest (Article 18) – although a suitable indemnification should be paid 
and the decision must be in accordance with the law - in which case the land reverts to the 
state (Article 27). 
 The BAL’s drafters aspired to develop a uniform national land law that honours 
Indonesian traditions, which, for land, come to the fore in the nation’s many and diverse local 
adat systems. Article 5 states that the agrarian law governing land and water is adat law, 
whereas Article 3 confirms the validity of communal (ulayat) adat land rights. However, the 
actual impact of these Articles is not so straightforward. Article 5 continues by posing the 
limiting conditions that adat may not conflict with national interests or those of the state, 
‘Indonesian Socialism’, other regulations in the BAL, or other laws. Article 3 prescribes that 
the effectuation of ulayat rights must take place in such a way as to be in accordance with 
national and state interests and may not be at odds with other legislation. Recognition of adat-
based land claims thus becomes possible only if no other legal claim is made to the land, and 
might be annulled if the limiting conditions of Article 5 require this. 
Formal recognition of a land claim requires registration of the plot by the National 
Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional). This agency registers land titles to individuals as 
one of seven private rights, defined in Article 16 of the BAL. There are four primary land 
rights: the right of ownership (hak milik), exploitation right (hak guna-usaha), building right 
(hak guna-bangunan), usage right (hak pakai), and three secondary land rights: lease right 
(hak sewa), exploitation right (hak membuka tanah) and the right to collect forest products 
(hak memungut-hasil-hutan). The BAL allows for the creation of additional land rights by 
new laws, and in 1974 a state management right (hak pengelolaan) and temporal usage rights 
derived from subsided adat rights such as the sharecropping right (hak usaha-bagi hasil), and 
a right of temporal occupation (hak menumpang) have become accepted as rights to land not 
listed in the BAL. 5 
 
The Basic Forestry Law 
With over seventy percent of Indonesia’s land mass defined as forestry land, those appointed 
as its managers are in an influential position. Since the early eighties this position is held by 
                                                 
4 Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria. Law 5 of 1960. 
5 Decision of the Minister of Internal Affairs No. 5/1974 
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the Department of Forestry, based on Law 5 of 1967 on the Basic Forestry Regulations6, the 
original Basic Forestry Law.  
 Law 5/1967 gives the state the authority to designate and manage Indonesia’s forest 
lands (Article 1 paragraph 1) –notwithstanding the earlier recording of the state’s authority 
over all land in Indonesia in the BAL- and charges the population with assisting the 
government in developing the nation. Law 5/1967 hence has little time for land claims by the 
population that oppose the interest of the state. Article 5 paragraph 1 states that all forest in 
Indonesia and the natural resources found therein are controlled by the state, which gave the 
state the right (Article 5 paragraph 2) to plan the usage of forests, decide all legal issues 
pertaining to forests and draw up legislation relating to the forests.  
 Law 5/1967 makes no reference to the BAL or the various categories of land rights 
listed therein. Article 2 distinguishes between state forest (hutan negara), where no BAL 
private ownership rights apply, and private forest (hutan milik) which is forest growing on 
privately owned land, generally known as ‘people’s forest’ that can be owned individually, 
commonly, or by a legal body (elucidation to Article 2). The key to forest ownership thus lies 
in landownership.  
The position of adat rights is a precarious one. The elucidation of Article 2 explains 
that adat rights to forest are limited to ulayat rights, the validity of which is to be reviewed 
critically and may not interfere with national interests or higher legislation. It is not stated 
how the validity of ulayat claims is to be reviewed, or by whom. Article 17 decrees that 
communal as well as individual usufruct rights to forests may remain in place, provided they 
are deemed still valid and do not interfere with other purposes for which the forest is used. 
This gives no recognition of ulayat claims: the elucidation of Article 17 states that since such 
claims cannot be verified, they cannot be honoured if they oppose government plans such as 
forest clearing or transmigration projects. The state designates forest land, which is not 
subject to the BAL, thus making it virtually impossible to have adat claims in forest land 
recognised. This meant that communities living in forest areas and working forest land would 
need to request usage rights from the forest authorities. Claims of property based on adat have 
no value in this situation. 
The Department of Forestry’s resistance against the BAL and the Department’s 
authoritative application of the Forestry Law by rejecting nearly all land claims in forest areas 
were causes of considerable resentment and uncertainty for those living in areas designated as 
forest land (see for instance McCarthy, 2000:104-113). Following on the heels of the 1999 
decentralisation laws, law 5/1967 was revised and reappeared as Law 41 of 1999 on 
For
n 
in 
ins conditions for 
is. It stipulates that an adat community can still be considered to exist if: 
 (rechtsgemeenschap) 
d function   
                                                
estry.7  
Law 41/1999 included various notable changes. First, the concept of adat forest (huta
adat) was introduced into forestry legislation. Adat forest is defined as state forest in the 
territory of an adat community (Article 1.6), and as such is not the exclusive domain of that 
adat community. The state remains in control of all forests and the natural resources with
them, and is responsible for defining their status (Article 4). State forest, as explained in 
Article 5.2., can take the shape of adat forest, but to do so the community claiming adat forest 
must qualify as an adat community first. The elucidation to Article 67 conta
th
 
a) the community still functions as a ‘law community’
b) adat institutions can be said to exist an
c) a clear adat territory can be discerned 
d) adat law institutions that are still respected exist and 
 
6 Undang-undang no 5 tahun 1967 Tentang Kententuan-Ketentuan Pokok Kehutanan. 
7 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 41 Tahun 1999 Tentang Kehutanan. 
 11
e) a harvest of forest produce is still collected from the area to meet daily needs 
ties, provided they can be proven to 
xist and are acknowledged as existing have the rights: 
est based on prevailing adat law provided this does not contradict 
c) to receive empowerment aimed at raising their level of prosperity8 
adat communities is 
ossible, it could even worsen the position of adat claims to forest land. 
uthori  
ons land 
 and the 
ent 
ith the 
 
 to 
l Resources, and to 
develop an inclusive land management and information system.11  
 
Article 67 itself states in paragraph 1 that adat communi
e
 
a) to collect forest products for the daily needs of the adat community 
b) to manage the for
official law; and 
 
It hence remains questionable whether law 41/1999 adds anything to forest law that improves 
the standing of adat claims other than that it indicates that recognition of 
p
 
Regional autonomy laws 
The regional autonomy laws of 1999 and 2004 delegated considerable administrative 
a ty to the regional level of government. Three key issues are of importance here. 
 First, the 1999 RAL transferred authorities from the central level mainly to the 
regional level of government. Article 11 paragraph 2 of Law 22/1999 explicitly menti
issues as a regional matter. The introduction of the RAL caused confusion as well as 
opportunistic interpretations by the new regional authorities. This is most visible in the 
forestry sector, as district governments applied various new Government Regulations9
decentralized authorities of Law 22/1999 to contravene the monopolist control of the 
Department of Forestry and begin giving out small scale logging concessions themselves. 
Within days of the coming into force of the 1999 RAL, forces within the central governm
effectuated a check on the regions’ authority over land. This was Presidential Decision 
10/2001 on the Realization of Regional Autonomy Regarding Land Issues.10 This decision 
instructed the preparation of new legislation regulating the authorities of the regions in land 
management, and decreed that until such legislation was available authority remained w
NLA. This decision failed to make much impact in the heyday of regional autonomy.  
The legislation ordered in Article 1 of Presidential Decision 10/2001 followed two years later
as Presidential Decision 34/2003 on National Authority in Land Issues. It orders the NLA
revise and refine the Basic Agrarian Law in accordance with National Assembly Policy 
Decree IX of 2001 on Agrarian Reform and Management of Natura
                                                 
8 Paragraph 2 continues with the statement that the existence or ending of adat communities such as referre
in paragraph 1 must be recorded in a regional regulation, whereas paragraph 3 states that more elaborate 
provisions should be formalised in a government regulation. Bedner and Van Huis (2008:184) actually identi
‘Catch 22’ dilemma in that: “Adat law communities can only fulfil their needs by collecting forest
because farming in forest areas is prohibited by law. As a result the communities concerned need 
‘empowerment’ but such empowerment would be paramount to mode
d to 
fy a 
 products, 
rnisation and might well cause them to 
unities.  
t Republik Indonesia Nomor 10 Tahun 2000 Tentang Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah di 
a 
utes 
for 
n adding 
loose their status as traditional communityas adat law comm
9 Mainly Government Regulations 6/1999 and 62/1998.  
10 Keputusan Presiden
Bidang Pertanahan. 
11 Then the instruction goes on in Article 2 to redefine district and municipal authorities with regard to land to 
limited set of powers: a. issuing location permits; b. land clearance for development; c. settlement of disp
over farmed land; d. settlement of disputes related to compensation and aid money in land clearance for 
development; e. determining subjects and objects of land redistribution, as well as determining compensation 
land exceeding the maximum permitted size or owned by an absentee landlord; f. determining and settling 
problems related to customary land (tanah ulayat); g. granting permits to open/develop new land and h. spatial 
planning. As with Presidential Decision 10/2001, one can question the actual validity of this instructio
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 Second, the RAL abrogated Law 5 of 1979 on Village Government. This law had 
introduced a Javanese model, the desa, as the basis of village government throughout the 
nation. This model clashed with local adat governance of the village and was experienced as 
an unwelcome intrusion by those preferring their own adat, although it provided opportunities 
to induce change for those opposing custom. Following the law, local government 
representatives were installed at the village level with largely the same tasks as the adat 
leaders carried out. The 1aw on Village Government thus introduced a competitor to adat that 
made it possible to substantially weaken, or overrule, the influence of its leaders. Law 
22/1999 contains a change of outlook. It defines a village (Article 1 under o) as: 
 
An undivided legal community with the authority to govern and regulate the interests 
of the local community on the basis of local origins and customs (asal-usul dan adat-
istiadat) which are acknowledged in the national government system and is 
[hierarchically] positioned below the district level.  
 
The acknowledgement of the existence of regulating origins and customs in this definition 
provides leverage for adat authority at the village level. This is further elaborated in Article 
99 which states that the scope of village government can be based on the rights of origin of 
the village, while Article 111 paragraph 2 states that all district regulations must take the 
rights, origins and traditions (hak, asal-usul, dan adat-istiadat) of the village into account. 
The RAL thus gives the position of the traditional authorities of the village a significant boost 
vis-à-vis the official authorities that he 1979 law on village government introduced. 
Third, an important point here is that Law 32/2004 promotes regional democracy by 
giving more responsibility to the position of the regional head. Articles 56 to 67 provide 
guidelines for the direct election of regional heads by the population instead of being 
appointed by the regional parliament. This change greatly increases the population’s influence 
in the governance of the area. Moreover, the central government gets the authority to suspend 
a regional head if he is sentenced for –among others- corruption, terrorism, subversion, 
threatening the state security or when sentenced to more than five years in prison for other 
reasons (Article 29 to 31). As members of the regional parliament, who are elected directly as 
well and can also be subjected to criminal prosecution, and the regional head together make 
up the regional government, this means that Law 32/2004 made this level of government 
accountable to both the regional population and the central government.  
 
Land registration 
Land registration is instructed in the BAL in order to provide claimants with a certificate 
stating their right to the land and thus to create certainty regarding the legal status of land 
claims. The BAL requires primary land rights to be recorded in a registryy 12, and exempts 
people who cannot afford registration expenses from payment for such registration.13 Upon 
registration people receive a land certificate, which may serve as evidence of their right. 
Nonetheless land registration does not appeal to Indonesia’s masses. NLA officers have been 
                                                                                                                                                        
to higher legislation. Although the actual impact of the instruction remains unclear, various regional 
governments have implemented it while officials of both the NLA and the Department of Forestry have been 
known to refer to it when disputing actions carried out by regional government officials. (Based on Personal 
communication by regional government civil servants as well as staff of NLA and forestry offices).   
12 BAL Articles 23, 32 and 38 in conjunction with 19. BAL in conjunction with Article 9 Government 
Regulation No. 24/1997 on Land Registration. 
13 BAL Article 19. However, Article 61(2) of Government Regulation No. 24/1997 on Land Registration states 
that people unable to afford registration can be exempted from part of or all the costs for registration. This 
regulation is an elaboration of BAL Article 19 and replaces Government Regulation No. 10/1961 on Land 
Registration. 
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known to demand high prices and have a general reputation for corruption. An NLA 
certificate by itself is rarely sufficient or decisive in a land dispute, even if the case is brought
before the court. For instance, Government Regulation 24/1997 on Land Registration which 
implements BAL provisions on this issue allows various documents as supportive evidence
for initial registration of land.
 
 
 
 
ther persons, rather than present themselves at 
w 
 
0 rupiah- minus a deduction decided by local government (ten million in Paser).17 Hence: 
   
14 This allows for claims to be awarded retroactively and has 
made the production of fake historical land documents a popular crime.15 The registration
system attracts criticism from NLA officials as well as from right holders. NLA officials 
lament the lack of popular effort to keep the system updated, thus causing sales, inheritances
or divisions of plots to go unrecorded and endanger their validity. Yet right holders, basing 
themselves on earlier cases of multiple-certification or non-registration of reported changes, 
expressed their distrust of NLA officials and the system in general. Many people prefer to put 
their trust in recognition of their land rights in their local connections - support of neighbours 
or other fellow-villagers, family members, or o
the expensive and uncertain NLA registry.     
 In Paser, land registration is on the rise. A lively trade in plots of land along the 
district’s roads is taking place as the district’s economic prosperity keeps attracting ne
migrants. The value of land in these semi-urban areas steadily increases, and it is not 
uncommon for people to invest in such plots. NLA certificates as proof of registration thus 
gain in importance. Unfortunately, the expenses of first time registration are a major obstacle 
to a large part of Paser’s poor. Anyone desiring a certificate needs to pay registration tax over
the land first.16 The tax is five percent of a fixed sum per square metre -for Paser, this sum is 
17
 Times 170 Min ion us 10 mill 5 percent Tax 
1 hectare 1,7 million negative negative none 
5 hectares 8,5 million negative negative none 
10 hectares 17 million 7 million 350,000 350,000 
tares 
hich would incur a tax of 1,200,000 rupiah. A 
o 
n 5% of that sum) are calculated to come to a yearly tax of 4% 
f the land’s estimated value. 
                                                
 
Registration tax is kept deliberately low in order to encourage people to register their lands. 
Notably the urban and semi-urban population along the roads profits from this situation. Yet 
especially the rural, indigenous Paserese population fails to register. Many rural Paserese are 
subsistence farmers who do however claim extensive tracks of land. In Paser up to 20 hec
can be registered as individual property, w
substantial sum for a subsistence farmer.  
 Moreover, a yearly tax needs to be paid to maintain property of the land which is als
based on a set sum per square metre. In Paser, this sum is 5,000 rupiah. Percentages of the 
total (20% of the total, and the
o
 
 
 
14 Examples of such documents include a counterpart original of a notary deed concerning a European ownership 
right; a private contract concerning the transfer of land that is witnessed by an adat leader / head of the village / 
head of the neighbourhood, created before the enactment of the 1997 Government Regulation; an official deed 
concerning the transfer of land which has not yet been registered; a colonial land tax document, or a letter by the 
land and building tax department clarifying the history of the land. In case the evidence is incomplete, witnesses 
or the person claiming the right can give testimony (see Harsono, 2005:495-498). 
15 Personal communication by judges at two East Kalimantan district courts and the national Supreme Court in 
Jakarta. 
16 This is the Bea Perolehan Hak Tanah Bangunan. 
17 Possible deductions differ per region and may fluctuate wildly. In Paser it is ten million, in neighbouring Kutai 
Kertanegara it is six million. After the boulevard case discussed in paragraph 8 Paser temporarily abandoned the 
discount while it stood as high as 30 million in 2005. 
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 Times 5000 20 percent 5 percent Tax 
1 hectare 50 million 10 million 500,000 500,000 
5 hectares 250 million 50 million 2,5 million 2,5 million 
10 hectares 500 million 100 million 5 million 5 million 
20 hectares 1000 million 200 million 10 million 10 million 
ls with 
atic procedure that induces expenses and 
l 
d, although urban and semi-urban poor 
ith small plots of land look favourably upon it.   
. Rights awareness and legal knowledge 
f a 
 
 
ng 
ing attention 
ot changed, but politics have. This 
alisation is spreading as well, but at a slower pace. 
 
A successful agrarian company will be quite able to pay 10 million in taxes on a yearly base 
for 20 hectares, but our subsistence farmer cannot. Citizens of Paser may request to be 
exempted from this tax or pay a lower amount –a regional government commission dea
these requests- but this is a long and bureaucr
moreover needs to be undertaken each year. 
 The combination of registration and taxation hence does not work well for traditiona
subsistence farmers claiming extensive plots of lan
w
 
 
5
 
Box 2: thinking of land law 
“Of course the land is mine, the government just does not recognise it”, is how a 
respondent from one of the remote mountain villages expressed his view on the legal 
status of his land claim. The land he claimed as his for usage, not as property, is part o
larger territory claimed by his community as their hereditary adat land. The regional 
government has never recognised that claim, but they are far away and hardly ever bother
the mountain communities. If they do, however, it is through large logging or reclaiming
projects which seriously impact local circumstances. After reformasi, adat has become 
part of the rights discourse in Paser and in recent years the government has started payi
attention. A dialogue with official law is taking place. At the same time knowledge of 
official land law is increasing in the population, making that land registration with the 
NLA is gaining in popularity. Recently, the local NLA office has started pay
to adat claims as well, making that official law is seen by many villagers as 
accommodating adat. Strictly speaking, the law has n
re
 
As may have become clear in the above, two elementary sources of rights to land are 
distinguished in Paser. Official law which is given shape through the authority of the regional 
government, the National Land Agency and the Department of Forestry, and the adat law tha
is applied through local adat leaders and a variety of adat organisations. For decades, a link 
between these two was practically nonexistent as the regional government referred mainly to 
official law in governing matters pertaining to land, and had little time for adat based claims 
or grievances. Issues most frequently occurring were disputes over land, generally taking the
shape of an individual or, frequently, a community, claiming adat rights to land for whic
usage right had been given out to a plantation company or to forest 
t 
 
h a 
for which a logging 
conces
ndonesia 
ns 
sion had been issued. This situation only changed recently.  
Following Suharto’s resignation, the Head of the National Land Agency/Minister of 
Agraria issued a Ministerial Instruction (number 5 of 1999) requiring all regions in I
to look into the existence of hak ulayat (communal adat land) in their territory and 
promulgate regional legislation formalizing their findings. For various reasons, few regio
actually acted upon this instruction but Paser’s government did. Following research the 
district government of the time concluded that there was no valid hak ulayat in the district, 
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although it was established that such rights had indeed existed in the past. The research also 
concluded that adat land rights still existed in the shape of hereditary plots of land, but thes
were inherited on an individual base, not communal. The findings of this research and the 
proposed regional decree invited considerable popular criticism and wreaked havoc on the 
district head’s popularity. As this was close before new district head elections would take 
place, the issue was left for the time being. The incumbe
e 
nt district head was not re-elected and 
Ridwan
ect 
 
e 
rovince’s indigenous population, this could well lead to unrest in 
 
e effect 
rth a price and many 
ompanies are in fact willing to pay, thus ensuring a good reputation. 
 power 
s 
. 
g adat 
such persistent rulings served to raise questions 
regarding the official status of adat land.  
                                                
 Suwidi, his successor, took this result at heart.  
Suwidi was not the only one to do so. Throughout East Kalimantan regional 
administrators started to allow space for adat land claims. Partly because of the new dir
election system which directly tied government officials to their performance, but also
because of fear inspired by the Dayak violence in West and Central Kalimantan. East 
Kalimantan had seen no ethnic fighting but new, more militant Dayak organisations had com
to the fore here as well. These groups maintained that if the government continued to ignore 
the adat land rights of the p
East Kalimantan as well.  
 When Ridwan Suwidi was elected district head of Paser in 2005, he chose to 
incorporate the issue of adat land rights in regional policies (see Bakker, 2009). One of 
Suwidi’s main election promises had been to increase the overall wealth of the district’s 
population and improve the living conditions of the population at large, but especially those of 
the ‘common people’.18 Improvement of access to land and a policy aimed at relaxation of the
tensions aroused by the announced hak ulayat legislation were part of his measures, although 
no new official legislation or instructions regarding the issue were formulated and the official 
legal status of adat land in Paser has not changed. Rather, the government considers th
of going against adat claims with care and unofficially condones (limited) claims for 
compensation of adat land in use by large companies. This is in part remarkable as such 
companies usually dispose of NLA certificates to the land, thus having the right to use the 
land according to official law. Yet peace and order in the district is wo
c
 
Plural normativity 
The effect of this situation is that many people in Paser perceive two normative systems, 
official law and adat, as governing access to land. Official law is strongest as it has the
of the state behind it, but mobilising this abstract power is no easy feat and its results 
uncertain. For claims concerning adat, the ready power of that authority can locally surpass 
that of state law, which it regularly does. Adat land claims are popularly thought of as 
recognised in official land law, whereas government authorities have for decades been 
unwilling to put this recognition into practice. This is put down to a general untrustworthines
of officials who are thought of as corruptly serving their own interests by having third party 
land claims prevail against payment over the just claims of adat communities. Yet few people 
are absolutely certain of such an unconditional recognition of adat land rights in official law
Until recently Paser’s NLA office would not accept requests for registration based on adat 
rights alone. Although many villagers felt that this was no doubt due to corrupt practices and 
desires for bribes, many consider it a sign that adat is not omnipotent. Likewise, judges at the 
regional court of law would in land cases never rule in favour of those solely maintainin
rights if their opponent possessed an NLA land certificate. Judges as well as other civil 
servants are considered as corruptible, but 
 
18  Phrased as ‘orang biasa yang pakai sarong’ by one of Suwidi’s assistants. After an incident in which a man 
in sarong wanted to speak with Suwidi, but feared that he would not be allowed to due to his dress. He was 
admitted, and the slogan was used in the campaign for some time.  
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 Popular opinion perceived officialdom’s dealings with access to land as subject to 
corrupt practices and as officials as above the law since they got away with it. Such 
perceptions tie in with the notions of patronage and ‘deep corruption’ discussed in the above, 
which see government officials as part of a larger, powerful network that literally controlled 
the implementation of law. The existence of such ties in the bureaucracy was clear to many 
individuals at the grassroots level, and usually accepted as beyond one’s control. Patrimonial 
relations thus were widely considered to control the unclear relation between official law and 
adat.  
 Reformasi and direct elections of regional leaders introduced a changed perspective to 
grassroots perspectives on power in Paser. The vocal presence of NGOs and adat 
organisations as well as the open attitude of Ridwan Suwidi towards popular problems and 
opinions instilled the notion that the population does have a say in local affairs. The regional 
government wants to maintain the peace and prosperity of the district, and is aware of its own 
need for popular support. The government hence is susceptible to appeals for justice, 
especially if made in public and with organised support by NGOs or adat organisations. This 
means that the government remains the major force of authority controlling official law as 
well as –to a large extend- adat, but the law is no longer there for the exclusive benefit of the 
happy few. If cases are brought to the fore with popular backing and regarding vital subjects 
such as land, the government can facilitate a solution that moves beyond a strict interpretation 
of official law. People are aware of this role of the government and attempts at seeking 
redress of grievances where official law will not grant them have thus gained a distinctly 
political dimension.  
 
 
6. Intermediaries in land rights 
Conflicts over land rights are rarely settled without outside support. Parties can involve a 
variety of intermediaries to generally argue their cause, lobby the forum deciding the dispute 
and –for certain bodies- put pressure on the opposing party. Being an intermediary is not a 
single or exclusive position. Authorities acting as intermediaries often act as conflict-resolvers 
in forums as well, but generally limit their role to one or the other in a given conflict. 
Authorities’ involvement and their role usually depends on the specific nature of the case 
although parties might also select authorities to argue their cause based on the power-relations 
and political constellations among these authorities; choosing an authority known to oppose 
the intermediary approached by the opposition in the land conflict.  
Intermediaries and forums (discussed in the next paragraph) thus are not mutually 
exclusive categories when it comes to the authorities capable of taking up these roles. The 
functions of intermediary and conflict-resolving, however, are quite specific, non-overlapping 
tasks. A decision-taker in a forum cannot be publicly seen to be awarding a party without 
clear and good cause, without accusations of corruption and nepotism, and hence damage to 
their reputation. An intermediary, on the other hand, has the sole task of representing his 
client’s interests by all means at the intermediaries’ disposal.  In Paser,  intermediaries can be 
divided into three main categories; government officials, the judiciary and adat leaders and 
organisations. It is not uncommon to have more than one category involved or various 
authorities from the same category, as both sides bring in those intermediaries as are most 
likely to substantiate their claim. Moreover, a decision or verdict given by an intermediary 
from one category may be countered or weakened by decisions given by authorities from 
other categories.   
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a. Government officials 
Government officials are a diverse range of civil servants mainly employed with the regional 
government In most cases village heads are involved in disputes at an early stage by one or 
other of parties, yet their involvement rarely suffices to settle a case. In cases in which the 
government has an interest, for instance land appropriation for general interests or conflicts 
over land in use by plantation companies, the regional government has teams of officials from 
its public administration division (tatapraja) standing by. These teams (pertanahan and 
senggeta respectively) are tasked with negotiating a solution with the parties involved, either 
by themselves or in collaboration with intermediaries of other categories. It is not uncommon 
for these teams to be proactive and monitor a conflict before their assistance is requested, as it 
is their task to maintain the peace in land disputes and avoid the development of serious 
conflicts in the district. As such, they are often informed of such potentially dangerous 
conflicts by the village head in whose area the conflict is taking place, and that village head 
may take the step of inviting tatapraja officials to take part in the meetings of this is deemed 
important for government interests.  
 
b. The judiciary 
The judiciary is rarely involved in an intermediary position. Few individual persons will bring 
their conflict before the court on their own account, as the court procedure is lengthy and 
costly, and no lawyers –who are often close to the judiciary in the regions- specialising in land 
matters live in Paser. Moreover, the court applies official law and is not inclined to make 
considerations regarding claims based on adat. From 2008 onwards, however, a shift in 
approach appears to be taking place. Under the influence of NLA officials the public 
prosecutor’s office has started to allow indemnifications for adat lands and to appreciate the 
social bearing of adat based land claims. Although this has so far not amounted to an 
adjudication of such lands and indemnifications are kept low as to avoid an increase in claims 
for the financial benefit, the step is an important one as no such considerations were made 
before. The change was unexpected for parties willing to bring land claims before the court, in 
general private or state companies rather than individuals. On the whole, however, the change 
was welcomed. Inclusion of indemnifications of adat land in the court procedure means that 
the grounds for demands for such indemnification made outside of the court -which was the 
only place where they could be made before- are losing their legitimacy if the court has 
already awarded compensation. The court taking adat land claims into consideration thus 
provides companies with a degree of protection from further demands for indemnification or 
even threats of violent reprisals. However, attention within the judiciary for adat as a source 
of rights makes it quite likely that lawyers, public prosecutors and –possibly- judges will gain 
prominence as intermediaries in land conflicts as well.  
 
c. Adat-derived authorities 
Adat authorities, the last category, are probably the most complex of them all. Adat, in Paser, 
is a very lively normative category that has validity for a large part of the population. Whereas 
the population is ethnically diverse and for a large part consists of immigrants, many of these 
agree to the validity of adat. As migrant communities settled in Paser throughout its history, 
many accepted land from the local rulers in exchange for their agreement to follow adat. Even 
if the interpretations among ethnically homogeneous migrant groups are mixed with the adat 
of their area of origin, a notice that local adat should be respected is quite common. In later 
migrants this notions exists as well. Adat concepts are common throughout Indonesia and the 
population of each area requires new arrival to respect their rights. For migrants arriving by 
themselves a respect for adat was essential to gain local acceptance, and for groups of 
transmigrants who usually hold land certificates and find strength in numbers, consideration 
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of local adat is if not essential, at least sensible. As such, many inhabitants of Paser who are 
second, third or even further removed descendants of migrants to the district consider 
Paserese adat if not as their own adat, then at least as the common norms of Paser. As their 
own interests are shaped and formulated with this adat in mind, many of these migrants will 
argue the validity of Paserese adat, even if they do not consider or present themselves as 
ethnic Paserese.  
 Authorities enforcing adat exist in a number of varieties. Traditional adat experts 
generally exist at the village level and are often called upon in first instances of dispute. They 
are able to settle a conflict swiftly and –usually- reasonably amicably, but they often do not 
have influence over unwilling opponents. In that case one of the various organisations 
championing adat rights might be of use. A few of these exist throughout Paser, and these are 
able to field eloquent and well-respected spokespersons with a reasonable knowledge of 
national law and contacts with local government officials. These can bring more social 
pressure to bear than the village-level adat authorities can, but not as much as a third category 
of adat organisations. These consist of a few organised groups that present themselves as 
‘adat councils’ or ‘adat militias’. These are larger organisations that add an element of 
compulsion to the procedure. When called upon, these organisations visit the opponent with a 
large group of members and attempt to convince him of their client’s rights. Whereas the 
large group itself can already be intimidating, covert or overt threats of violence and land 
occupations may well be part of the procedure. For one group the threat and exercise of 
violence is their one strategy, most others prefer the threat as a means to force negotiation. 
These organisations are mainly called upon in conflict with large, non-local opponents such as 
plantation or mining companies. Such enterprises prefer to bring any disputes before the 
district court –which will usually confirm the validity of the official certificates and permits 
that the companies possess. The adat militias take the opposite stance; their main take on 
valid law is not with official law but on adat rights. If rights under official law violate adat 
rights, return of lands or indemnifications are in order. The police do not object to these 
organisations since, as one officer put it: “they ensure that local adat is respected and no 
conflict arises from it. We do not know local adat, so we cannot fulfil this task.”         
 
 
7. Access to Forums 
 
Box 4: “When I needed to have my land claim affirmed I went to the PBA, a Paserese 
adat council that is also an NGO. They went to talk to the company that was using my 
land and asked them to pay me. First the company would not do so, but then the PBA 
went again, this time with many people and wearing their official clothes and with the 
entero leading them. The entero explained that my claim was really valid according to 
Paserese adat and then the company was willing to pay me. I gave part of the money to 
the PBA to thank them” (explanation given by a Paserese villager as to how he got a 
claim for land indemnification awarded by a palm oil plantation company). 
 
 The quantity and accessibility of forums to approach to solve land related grievances has 
increased in recent years. Whereas in past decades such institutions as the district government, 
district court of law and the NLA were all located in the capital of Tanah Grogot, the present 
situation in which adat organisations as well as the district government through its tatapraja 
teams attempt to keep up with developments and sentiments in the district, makes that it is 
relatively easy for Paser’s inhabitants to contact a forum’s representatives. Moreover, Paser’s 
infrastructure has greatly improved. The introduction of public transport as well as the 
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widespread availability and ownership of motorbikes make that Tanah Grogot is a destination 
that can be reached by nearly everyone. 
 Two different categories, official and unofficial, of forums can be distinguished. Both 
refer to different types of authority and each has its specific qualities and drawbacks. Forums 
can be accessed on the level of the village or the sub-district –in many instances the difference 
between these two is negligible- or at the level of the district, which means that higher, more 
powerful authorities are approached. The choice between the two is generally influenced by 
the seriousness of the issue –does one prefer an amicable solution or is it an all-out conflict?- 
and by the identity of the claimant; adat is a strong factor, but adat is a source of rights that is 
only available to Paserese or migrants with good contacts. Essentially, the following forums 
can be accessed. 
 
a. Village administrators and local adat councils 
Each village has a village head who is part of the government administration system, and all 
villages that are Paserese in origin have an adat leader. Most disputes at the level of the 
village are initially judges by either or both of these authorities. In both cases enforcement of 
decisions generally depends on persuasion, the force of which varies. Some of these village-
level authorities are charismatic and well-liked persons who enjoy a broad popular support for 
their actions, which puts popular pressure on defendants to comply. Others, however, do not 
enjoy such prestige and hence lack real authority. The identity of the defendant is of 
importance as well. Is he a local villager, a Paserese or an immigrant, someone with 
connections and friends or a simple peasant? Villagers can be powerful individuals who may 
ignore an adat leader’s decisions and bribe the village head. When either claimant or 
defendant find the case of sufficient importance to take it beyond the village, the sub-district 
head may be approached –although this authority has little more authority than the village 
head- or the local chapter of any of Paser’s regional adat movements might be contacted. In 
the latter case, the matter swiftly moves up to the regional leadership of these informal 
authorities, which might bring in regional-level official authorities on behalf of the opposing 
party. The specific capacities of these respective forums have been discussed in paragraph 3. 
 
b. The courts 
The major official forum at the regional level is the district court of law. Cases brought before 
this court are dealt with strictly in accordance with national land law, meaning that the judges 
will base their decision largely on the legislation discussed in paragraph four. For those in 
possession of a land certificate this is a clear and acceptable situation, for those arguing adat 
rights to land the court is a waste of time. As a consequence, a party referring to adat rights to 
land is unlikely to bring the case before the court. First because the decision will be a 
foregone conclusion, second because many parties arguing adat rights will disregard the 
court’s decision and revert to other, possibly more heavy-handed, authorities. For the sake of 
cordial relations refraining from involving the court can hence be a sensible course of action 
for parties in possession of a land certificate as well. Obviously, enforcement of a court 
decision is one of the tasks of the police, but many respondents indicated a distrust of its 
officers who may lack in dedication or demand payment for their efforts. Moreover, if the 
opponent is persistent in referring to adat, he may be able to mobilise support by an adat 
organisation who –as indicated before- are given considerable freedom by the police.  
 As indicated above, however, adat is making some inroads into the considerations of 
the court; if not as a source of rights to land, then at least as a reason to award 
indemnification. Moreover, bringing adat into the court seems to be resulting in bringing the 
court’s authorities –who are well-versed in national land law- out of their forum role and into 
the local discussions and conflicts over land rights as intermediaries.      
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c. Supra-local adat organisations 
Adat organisations operate for a select clientele, and with considerable autonomy from the 
state. As such they are not beyond criticism and various organisations have highly different 
reputations among migrants as well as among Paserese. Essentially reputations depend on the 
frequency of the usage of violence, demands for and heights of payments and the willingness 
of spokespersons to take the position and interest of both sides into account. Two or three 
organisations can almost be equalled to mediators; they will state relevant adat rules, consider 
the circumstances under which the offence was committed, verify any such claims to adat 
rights as are being made and consider all this in the light of the present situation. They will 
attempt to reach an agreement between parties, rather than one-sidedly enforce the interest of 
the party referring to adat. Two other organisations, however, are largely thugs for rent that 
will support the party claiming adat rights provided they will get paid. Cases in which this 
group is involved virtually always involve violence. By coincidence, the group has its 
headquarters opposite Paser’s jail. Its leader and a number of other members have been jailed 
on various occasions. 
 
d. Regional head 
The regional government, most notably the district head, forms the highest authority for 
parties to refer to. Not many cases reach this level; to many individuals, the district head still 
is an elevated authority who is not to be troubled with trifling matters. Also, appealing to this 
authority is not without commitment as a decision by the district head cannot be ignored 
without incurring the government’s displeasure resulting in official enforcement. Perhaps 
most important, the district head is no official conflict-deciding forum but rather an impartial 
executor of government administration in the district. Cases must have a sizeable scale or be 
causing considerable social disquietude, thus more or less demanding a decision taken at the 
highest regions of government authority. In the case of Paser’s present district head, Ridwan 
Suwidi, his reputation as a socially concerned and conscientious administrator sustains wide 
acceptance of his decision in Paserese society. 
 The following matrix serves as a schematic illustration of the pros and contras of the 
various forums discussed in this paragraph:    
   
 Preferred  by 
migrants 
Preferred 
by Paserese 
Preferred by 
companies 
Decision will 
be enforced 
Can be 
corrupted 
location 
village       
Adat leader 
 
no yes no maybe yes close 
Village head 
 
yes yes yes maybe yes close 
Regional       
District court maybe maybe yes maybe yes Relatively 
close, but 
psychological 
barrier 
Adat 
organisations 
no yes no yes yes  close 
Regional Head 
 
yes yes yes yes no Relatively 
close, but 
psychological 
barrier 
 
 
 
 21
 
 
8. The role of the NLA 
In the examples given in paragraph eight the NLA does not come to the fore as a crucial 
agency. Nonetheless its societal significance has considerably increased following reform. 
Whereas before the agency operated according to a strict interpretation of the BAL and the 
national political course, its present staff contains a fair number of reformers quite willing to 
engage from within a local context with such specific issues as present themselves. Like the 
district head, the NLA is using greater administrative discretion and the wide possibilities 
provided by the laws discussed in paragraph 6 to show initiative and inventiveness in settling 
local issues. Yet the agency remains in the background. It is, after all, not part of the district 
government apparatus but a decentralised unit of a central institution. Strictly speaking, it is 
largely independent from Paser’s district government and in no way obliged to cooperate with 
inventive schemes. However, cooperation does ensure the agency a role in local affairs and an 
advisory capacity in local policies; it makes that a specialist institution is included and hence 
rendered effective. A low level of visibility is not a bad course to proceed along since it 
precludes accusations of neglect of duty from officials higher up in the NLA hierarchy. 
Moreover, it was not the NLA alone that gained in prominence, so did several other agencies 
and offices. The NLA thus rose to the fore among others. 
 The role of the agency in overt conflict is limited. Officially its register of right 
holders and their plots should be the source on which the qualified decision-taking authority 
bases his conclusion, but as this authority often is the district court –which parties frequently 
avoid- NLA-registered rights are arguments rather than absolute values.  
 
Competition within the government 
As the discussion in paragraph 6 of the three main laws of relevance to land access illustrated, 
various government agencies have authority over land. Next to the NLA these are the 
Department of Forestry and the regional government. The respective areas of authority of the 
NLA and the Department of Forestry are demarcated on a map of which both agencies 
possess a copy. The authority of the NLA is largely concentrated in and around Paser’s urban 
areas, its coastal zone and as a broad corridor along the major roads. The rest of the district, 
some 65 percent, hence falls under the Department of Forestry. This means, for instance, that 
many claims of adat land initially concern forest land. The rural parts of Paser where 
subsistence farmers claim 20 hectares (see paragraph 6) are essentially beyond the authority 
of the NLA. That does not mean, however, that the agency is unwilling to issue land 
certificates to plots in those areas. Small villages connected by roads and disposing of 
electricity and telephone connections are located here, so claiming the area as forest is a 
retainment of outmoded circumstances. Even a “conscious obstruction of development by the 
Department of Forestry” as one government official –who preferred to remain anonymous- 
put it. The Department of Forestry will not hand over its authority voluntarily, but is also not 
able to enforce it locally. Overshadowed by the combined forces of the NLA and the district 
government, the regional office of the Department turns a blind eye to the local NLA nibbling 
away at its territory.      
 
Whither the poor? 
From the position of Paser’s poor, the stance of the government in controlling access to land 
has immensely improved over the past few years. The previous rigid stance in which the 
interest of ‘Jakarta’ were prioritised is largely replaced by one in which officials focus on 
local needs and problems. Obviously they cannot ignore the greater framework of provincial 
or even national politics and it is still not uncommon for politicians to maintain personal 
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interests as well, but on the whole many of Paser’s poor feel that the bureaucracy has changed 
for the better.  
 The bureaucracy, for its part, contains many officials who wholeheartedly agree with 
this observation. Many feel that their loyalty is to the state, which concretely means to the 
population of their jurisdiction. To many career-officials improving the conditions of life in 
Paser is a serious challenge which they enjoy engaging with. Yet, as a senior department head 
sensibly pointed out, a lot depends on who is in charge. At present Paser has a district head 
with a major interest in improving life in the district, but another head could bring a turn of 
affairs. Few officials feel that they would stand up to this to the level of giving up their 
position. A populace engaging with local politics and controlling their elected representatives, 
many officials felt, thus is of major importance to the social consciousness of a regional 
bureaucracy’s political actions. If elements of that bureaucracy engage with social 
developments, progressive officials felt, so much for the better. The course of action of the 
NLA thus has sincere supporters both among the population and within the bureaucracy.    
 
 
9. Conclusions. Access to justice for the landless poor? 
The present post-New Order situation in which the Indonesian economy is steadily recovering 
from the crisis of the late nineteen nineties has given rise to numerous stimuli influencing the 
land tenure situation, as this case study of Paser illustrates. International companies invest in 
natural resource exploitation, stimulating the local economy while simultaneously creating 
stiff competition for land usage. Increased democracy has seen district heads and politicians 
start to heed the needs and interests of the local masses of voters, but this can work adversely 
as popular expectations do not live up to government means. Land indemnification for the 
construction of Tanah Grogot’s boulevard and the ensuing expectations of high prices paid for 
land needed to broaden the main road is an example of this. The boulevard and other 
examples illustrate that the regional level of government is relatively autonomous from 
central government in plotting its own course in land matters, and that local land conflicts are 
mediated and settled by a variety of authorities, many of whom do not have such powers 
according to the law. Whereas this allows for original thoughts and pragmatic solutions that 
bypass a strictly bureaucratic application of the law, it does not necessarily contribute to a 
stable situation. Access to justice in matters of land access in Paser is dynamic and, if 
anything, a road of which the direction regularly changes. This is not necessarily a bad thing. 
Notably when it comes to poor people –by their own definition or by that of others- a strong 
readiness exists locally to look into their interests. This readiness is manifest in various ways. 
First in the willingness of individuals to come forward and state their grievances, second in 
the formation of non-government organisations –for instance adat organizations- representing 
the interests of these people and, third, in the willingness of the regional government to 
engage with these issues. 
 This does not mean, however, that these factors preclude other interests. The potential 
of equating the poor to those who maintain adat claims to land is a strategy that brings a 
considerable (potential) following to those championing the observance of adat rights. Poor 
subsistence farmers from the hinterlands do not approach the NLA of their own accord. 
Deference to state authority, combined with a (comfortable) remoteness of state 
representatives and a distrust of government officials, stop these poor from manifesting 
themselves beyond their own environment if outside support is absent. Introducing and 
providing such support thus provides not only assistance to these poor but also, in the best 
Foucauldian tradition, a vehicle to access district government. The predicament of the poor –
as well as the category of ‘poor’ itself- thus can be used as a stepping stone to greater social 
power by the upwards mobile; be it politicians or leaders of non-governmental organisations. 
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This aspect is an important aspect of the reason why the poor get noticed. Ambitious social 
leaders need support to rise above their peers and the poor can provide it. Land conflict and its 
resolution provide a useful arena. Both the BAL and adat have ambiguous roles in land 
conflicts. Recognition of adat claims to land might well interfere with BAL-derived rights of 
others, be it large companies or poor (descendants of) immigrants. Claimants of adat land 
rights may be poor, but they are not the only poor land users.   
 ‘The poor’ are more than an element in an equation for access to power. They cannot 
be simplified into a category subject to the whims of authorities in search of power, but they 
can hardly be seen as a homogeneous group with common interests either. What unites groups 
of people subject to conditions of restricted access to land is a shared legal consciousness, an 
abstract notion of how the law ought to be and what it should do: an ideal situation that cannot 
be reached by those without power. Yet they can, as the masses sustaining leaders and 
representatives, influence the directionality of events. ‘The poor’ thus are a source of political 
power for those in positions of leadership as much as a force directing where these leaders 
should take them if they want to maintain support. 
 The issue of land registration shows a large category within the poor is unable to effort 
registration of land or the yearly taxes such property incurs. The land-tax system is geared 
towards people with a modicum of financial income and relatively small plots of land -the 
urban and semi-urban areas- or towards large commercial agricultural enterprises. The adat 
groups practicing shifting cultivation and subsistence farming on large tracks of land are by 
no means able to raise the taxes that their claims would command. Their problem is 
thoroughly foreign to the theoretical assumptions underlying Paser’s land taxes, in which a 
large areal equals intensive commercial exploitation. Tax deductions for such traditional 
modes of land usage could be a solution in theory, but would lead to gross inequality once 
these fiscal advantages become incorporated in the market economy and adat land is leased 
out to companies. The current situation in which claimants do not request registration and the 
NLA refrains from actual registration in these areas is a go-between, but a more constructive 
solution will be needed in the future. 
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